the tcsec system evaluation criteria is used to evaluate systems of what type:

The Orange Volume

Trusted Reckoner System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) is a United states of america Government Department of Defence force (DoD) standard that sets basic requirements for assessing the effectiveness of estimator security controls built into a calculator system. The TCSEC was used to evaluate, allocate and select estimator systems being considered for the processing, storage and retrieval of sensitive or classified information.

The TCSEC, frequently referred to equally the Orange Book, is the centerpiece of the DoD Rainbow Serial publications. Initially issued in 1983 by the National Computer Security Center (NCSC), an arm of the National Security Agency, and and so updated in 1985. TCSEC was replaced by the Common Criteria international standard originally published in 2005.

Contents

• ane Key objectives and requirements
  • 1.1 Policy
  • 1.ii Accountability
  • 1.3 Balls
  • one.four Documentation
• two Divisions and classes
  • 2.one D — Minimal protection
  • 2.2 C — Discretionary protection
  • ii.iii B — Mandatory protection
  • 2.4 A — Verified protection
• 3 Matching classes to environmental requirements
• 4 Run into also
• v References
• 6 External links

Central objectives and requirements

The Orange Book or DoDD 5200.28-STD was canceled by DoDD 8500.i on October 24, 2002. ^[1]

Policy

The security policy must be explicit, well-defined and enforced past the computer organization. In that location are two basic security policies:

• Mandatory Security Policy - Enforces access control rules based directly on an individual's clearance, say-so for the data and the confidentiality level of the information existence sought. Other indirect factors are physical and environmental. This policy must likewise accurately reverberate the laws, general policies and other relevant guidance from which the rules are derived.
• Mark - Systems designed to enforce a mandatory security policy must store and preserve the integrity of access control labels and retain the labels if the object is exported.
• Discretionary Security Policy - Enforces a consistent set of rules for decision-making and limiting access based on identified individuals who have been determined to have a need-to-know for the information.

Accountability

Individual accountability regardless of policy must be enforced. A secure means must be to ensure the access of an authorized and competent amanuensis which can then evaluate the accountability information within a reasonable amount of time and without undue difficulty. There are three requirements under the accountability objective:

• Identification - The procedure used to recognize an individual user.
• Hallmark - The verification of an private user's authorization to specific categories of information.
• Auditing - Inspect information must exist selectively kept and protected so that actions affecting security can be traced to the authenticated individual.

Assurance

The computer arrangement must contain hardware/software mechanisms that can exist independently evaluated to provide sufficient assurance that the arrangement enforces the above requirements. By extension, assurance must include a guarantee that the trusted portion of the system works merely as intended. To achieve these objectives, 2 types of assurance are needed with their corresponding elements:

• Assurance Mechanisms
• Operational Balls: System Compages, System Integrity, Covert Channel Analysis, Trusted Facility Direction and Trusted Recovery
• Life-bicycle Assurance : Security Testing, Design Specification and Verification, Configuration Direction and Trusted System Distribution
• Continuous Protection Assurance - The trusted mechanisms that enforce these basic requirements must be continuously protected confronting tampering and/or unauthorized changes.

Documentation

Within each class there is additional documentation prepare which addresses the evolution, deployment and direction of the arrangement rather than its capabilities. This documentation includes:

• Security Features User's Guide, Trusted Facility Manual, Test Documentation and Design Documentation

Divisions and classes

The TCSEC defines iv divisions: D, C, B and A where sectionalisation A has the highest security. Each partition represents a pregnant departure in the trust an private or system tin identify on the evaluated system. Additionally divisions C, B and A are cleaved into a serial of hierarchical subdivisions called classes: C1, C2, B1, B2, B3 and A1.

Each division and grade expands or modifies equally indicated the requirements of the immediately prior division or grade.

D — Minimal protection

• Reserved for those systems that accept been evaluated but that fail to meet the requirements for a higher division

C — Discretionary protection

• C1 — Discretionary Security Protection
  • Identification and authentication
  • Separation of users and information
  • Discretionary Access Control (DAC) capable of enforcing admission limitations on an individual basis
  • Required Arrangement Documentation and user manuals
• C2 — Controlled Access Protection
  • More finely grained DAC
  • Individual accountability through login procedures
  • Inspect trails
  • Object reuse
  • Resource isolation

B — Mandatory protection

• B1 — Labeled Security Protection
  • Breezy statement of the security policy model
  • Data sensitivity labels
  • Mandatory Admission Control (MAC) over selected subjects and objects
  • Label exportation capabilities
  • All discovered flaws must be removed or otherwise mitigated
  • Blueprint specifications and verification
• B2 — Structured Protection
  • Security policy model conspicuously divers and formally documented
  • DAC and MAC enforcement extended to all subjects and objects
  • Covert storage channels are analyzed for occurrence and bandwidth
  • Carefully structured into protection-critical and non-protection-critical elements
  • Pattern and implementation enable more comprehensive testing and review
  • Hallmark mechanisms are strengthened
  • Trusted facility management is provided with administrator and operator segregation
  • Strict configuration management controls are imposed
• B3 — Security Domains
  • Satisfies reference monitor requirements
  • Structured to exclude code not essential to security policy enforcement
  • Significant arrangement technology directed toward minimizing complexity
  • Security administrator function defined
  • Inspect security-relevant events
  • Automated imminent intrusion detection, notification, and response
  • Trusted organization recovery procedures
  • Covert timing channels are analyzed for occurrence and bandwidth
  • An case of such a organization is the XTS-300, a precursor to the XTS-400

A — Verified protection

• A1 — Verified Design
  • Functionally identical to B3
  • Formal design and verification techniques including a formal top-level specification
  • Formal management and distribution procedures
  • An case of such a system is Honeywell'due south Secure Communications Processor SCOMP, a precursor to the XTS-400
• Beyond A1
  • Arrangement Architecture demonstrates that the requirements of self-protection and completeness for reference monitors accept been implemented in the Trusted Computing Base of operations (TCB).
  • Security Testing automatically generates test-example from the formal top-level specification or formal lower-level specifications.
  • Formal Specification and Verification is where the TCB is verified down to the source code level, using formal verification methods where feasible.
  • Trusted Pattern Environment is where the TCB is designed in a trusted facility with just trusted (cleared) personnel.

Matching classes to environmental requirements

Regular army Regulation 380-nineteen is an example of a guide to determining which system form should be used in a given situation.

See also

• AR 380-19 superseded by AR 25-2
• Common Criteria
• ITSEC
• Trusted Platform Module
• Rainbow Series

References

1. ^ http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/850001p.pdf

External links

• National Security Institute - 5200.28-STD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
• FAS IRP DOD Trusted Figurer System Evaluation Criteria DOD 5200.28

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Source: https://p2k.utn.ac.id/IT/en/3069-2966/Trusted-Computer-System-Evaluation-Criteria_15662_p2k-utn.html

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